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ABSTRACT 
This paper critically examines the concept of Domicile, the General Rules, makes clear the position of Prisoners, 
Married women, Refugees, Fugitives from justice, Fugitive debtors, Invalids, Corporations. It contrasts the 
domicile of origin concept from the domicile of choice and suggests that the concept of domicile should be 
abolished in favour of nationality since they should be defined to mean the same thing. 
It introduces a purely new dimension to the concept of domicile stating reasons why every person should have 
only one domicile at any point in time. It tells us that the idea is very workable and that the concept of revival of 
domicile of origin should be done away with; while there should be no distinction between domicile and 
nationality. At the end of the paper, we get to know why dual nationality should be expunged globally. 
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                                                            INTRODUCTION 
According to the Oxford dictionary of Law2, a person can be said to be domiciled in a country which he treats as 
his permanent home, and to which he has the closest legal attachment. A person cannot be without a domicile 
and cannot have two domicile at once3. At birth, he acquires a domicile of origin which is normally his father’s 
domicile. He retains his domicile of origin until (if ever) he acquires a domicile of choice in its place. 
In England, it has long been settled that questions affecting status are determined by the law of the domicile of 
the Propositus, and such questions are those affecting family relations and family property4. There are currently 
two main classes of domicile namely the domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The domicile of origin is 
acquired at birth, and in this case, could be the domicile of the father or that of the mother, according as he is 
legitimate or illegitimate5. 
 
The domicile of choice is acquired at any time after a person has become of full age and capacity with the 
intention of making a country his permanent base, and it can always be replaced at Will by a new domicile of 
choice6. 
The concept of domicile is not uniform throughout the world. Lord Cranworth in Whicker v. Hume7 said ‘….. by 
domicile, we mean the home, the permanent home, and if you do not understand your permanent home, I am 
afraid that no illustration drawn from foreign writers or foreign languages will very much help you to it’. 
Therefore, the acquisition of a domicile of choice requires not only residence in a territory subject to a distinctive 
legal system, but also an intention to remain there permanently. Permanently here refers to lasting or designed to 
last indefinitely without change. This best describes the nature of intention necessary for a change of domicile 
and most Judges seem to have recognized this definition8. 
 
Scarman J. said a domicile of choice is acquired only if it be affirmatively shown that the Propositus is resident 
within a territory subject to a distinctive legal system with the intention formed independently of external 
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pressures, of residing there indefinitely1. It is clear that the intended residence must not be for a limited period of 
time. 
 
                                          GENERAL RULES OF DOMICILE 
1) It is a settled principle that nobody shall be without a domicile, and in order to make this effective, the 
Law assigns a domicile of origin to every person at birth (which is that of the father for a legitimate 
child) and  that of the mother for an illegitimate child, and to a Foundling the place where he is 
found2. This prevails until a new domicile has been acquired3, so that if a person leaves the country of 
his origin with an undoubted intention of never returning to it again, his domicile of origin subsists 
until he actually settles with the requisite intention in some other country. 
2) A person cannot have two domicile - since the object of the law in insisting that no person shall be 
without a domicile is to establish a definite legal system by which certain of his rights and obligation 
may be governed, and since the facts and events of his life frequently impinge upon several countries, 
it is necessary on practical grounds to hold that he cannot possess more than one domicile at the same 
time, at least for the same purpose. 
3) Domicile signifies connection with a simple system of territorial law, but it does not necessarily 
connote a system that prescribes identical rules for all classes of persons. 
4) There is a presumption in favour of the continuance of an existing domicile. Hence, the burden of 
proving a change lies in all cases upon those who allege that a change has occurred4. The standard of 
proof necessary to rebut the presumption is that adopted in civil actions which requires the intention 
of the Propositus to be proved on a balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt as is the 
case in Criminal Proceedings5. 
5) Subject to certain statutory exceptions6, the domicile of a person is to be determined according to the 
English, and not the foreign concept of domicile7.   
 
ACQUISITION OF DOMICILE OF CHOICE 
  Residence and Intention must concur as elements before a domicile of choice can be established. It should be 
noted that long residence does not constitute nor does brief residence negate domicile. For instance, in Inland 
Revenue Commissioners V. Bullock8, a Canadian who had a domicile of origin in Nova Scotia was held not to 
have become domiciled in England, despite the fact that he had either served R.A.F or lived in England for over 
40 years. He retained his domicile in Nova Scotia because he intended to return there should his wife predecease 
him. A brief residence is no obstacle to the acquisition of a domicile if the necessary intention exists. For 
example, if a man clearly intends to live in another country permanently, as for example, where an emigrant, 
having wound up his affairs in the country of his origin, flies off with his wife and family to Australia, his mere 
arrival there will satisfy the element of residence9. It can also be illustrated as follows: A man abandoned his 
home in State P, and took his family to a house in State M, about half a mile from P, intending to live there 
permanently. Having deposited his belongings there, he and his family returned to P, in order to spend the night 
with a relative. He fell ill and died there. It was held that his domicile at death was in M. 
Motive is one of the indices of intention as a requisite for the acquisition of a domicile of choice. Firstly, it may 
throw light upon the question as to whether the movement to another country was intended to be permanent10. It 
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will serve for instance to contrast the case of a man who flees to England to escape political persecution in his 
own country with that of a retired Officer who goes to Jersey to avoid heavy taxation. Secondly, it may provide a 
means of testing the sincerity of a declaration of intention. However, the only intention relevant to a change of 
domicile is an intention to settle permanently in a country. 
Domicile of choice must be voluntary, not of constraint. But in several cases, the circumstances may raise a 
doubt as to whether such freedom exists. For instance, freedom may not be said to exist in the instances given 
below:  
 
a) Prisoners: a clear example of constraint preclusive of this freedom is imprisonment in a    
foreign country, and there is no doubt that a prisoner, except perhaps one transported or exiled for life retains the 
domicile that he possessed before his confinement1. 
     b)   Refugees: any motive that induces the flight no doubt shows that there was no intention 
           of permanent residence in the chosen asylum. But this may be reversed where the    
           Refugee continues to retain the residence after a return to the original country has  
           become safe and practicable2.                             
c) Fugitives from justice: this is another example of involuntary residence. If a man leaves    his domicile 
in order to escape the consequences of a crime, the natural inference is that he has left it forever and that 
a presumption arises in favour of the acquisition of fresh  domicile in the country of refuge. 
d) Fugitive debtors: Freedom of choice is definitely affected when a man finds it desirable to flee the 
country to avoid his creditors. Whether this raises a presumption against an intention to return to his own 
country must obviously depend upon a variety of circumstances, such as the amount of the debts, the 
possibility of meeting them, the imminence of legal proceedings, the activities of the debtor in his new 
residence, e.t.c. 
It certainly cannot be said that the adoption of the new residence perse effects a change of domicile until all the 
listed factors have been weighed and shown whether or not he will  escape permanently3. 
e) Invalids: the principle is that unless a man is a free agent, his adoption of a new residence does not 
effect a change of domicile. He must have the alternative of staying or leaving. For instance, if a man is 
assured by his doctors that he has a few months to live, and he decides to spend the short remainder of 
his life in a country where the climate may alleviate his suffering, it would seem clear if all sentiments of 
pity is dismissed, that of his own volition, he has chosen a new permanent home, since he intends to 
continue his new residence until death.  
f) Miscellaneous Cases: if a person resides abroad in pursuance of his duties as a public servant of his own 
Government (e.g. an Ambassador), a Military Attaché, Naval Officer or a Consul, or if he is an 
employee under contract to go where sent, the inference to be drawn from the cause of the residence is 
that it is not intended to be permanent4. In such cases, the existing domicile is retained unless there are 
additional circumstances from which a contrary intention can be inferred.  Thus, it has been held that 
even a member of the armed forces may acquire a domicile in a foreign country where he is 
compulsorily resident and even when he is liable to be removed at any moment by higher authority, if 
there is sufficient evidence of his intention to settle there permanently as soon as he once more becomes 
a free agent5. The fact that the area of his new home coincides with his area of service does not perse 
preclude him from acquiring a new domicile. Certainly, if the requisite residence and intention are 
satisfactorily proved, he may acquire a domicile in a country other than that in which he is compulsorily 
serving 6 . It can be said that a person who enters the armed forces of a foreign power in such 
circumstances as to  
necessitate his indefinite residence in the foreign country, acquires a new domicile there7. 
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                                BURDEN OF PROOF OF CHANGE OF DOMICILE 
 Firstly, English Judges are of the view that it requires far stronger evidence to establish  the 
abandonment of a domicile of origin in favour of a fresh domicile than to establish a change from one domicile 
of choice to another. 
 Secondly, and by way of contrast, it has been held that a change of domicile from one country to 
another under the same Sovereign, as from Jersey or Scotland to England, is more easily proved than a change to 
a foreign country1. 
According to Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law, ‘nationality’ and ‘domicile’ are two different 
conceptions and that a man may change the latter without divesting himself of his nationality2. With due respect, 
I disagree with this view because once a person intends to be resident permanently in a country other than his 
country of origin, he intends to be a National of that new country. That is why we have the concept of dual 
nationality. Globally, many people of different nationality are in the possession of a dual citizenship status. For 
example, many Americans living and working in Nigeria have acquired the Nigerian citizenship status by 
naturalization, and this is what obtains in the United States of America, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Japan and so many other countries. So long as a person intends to permanently reside in another country until 
death, the person should expect the Law of the place to govern him in all his personal affairs and even his 
property on death. The person is deemed to have become a citizen of that country by naturalization. He is 
deemed to have adopted the Law of that country as his personal Law. So, we cannot really divorce the concept of 
domicile of choice from nationality, particularly if the domicile is from one country to another. Whereby a 
person intends to change his domicile within a country, for instance when a person moves from her State of 
origin with the intention to reside and permanently settle in another State (still within the same country), then we 
can say that domicile and nationality remain two different concepts since it is taken that those States have 
different Laws which vary considerably in content and meaning. However, the truth in my candid view remains 
that it makes no sense for States within a country to have different Laws governing them. A uniform system of 
Laws in every country of the World is most desirable. 
    Some of the problems usually encountered on the analysis of the concept of domicile is that it is usually 
misused. It is my humble view that a domicile of choice should not be applied to change of permanent residence 
within a particular country, but only from one country to another. The fact is that not so many countries of the 
world operate different systems of Laws from one State to another. In Nigeria, for example, a man’s property is 
governed by the English Law once the deceased was known with proof to have married under the English Law, 
irrespective of which State he might have decided to reside in Nigeria till his death, even if that particular State is 
not his State of origin. Countries that operate Uniform system of Laws3, use domicile as a term for change of 
permanent residence from one country to another with the requisite intention of living there till a person dies, 
and this helps us understand the concept more, and convinces us that domicile and nationality mean one and the 
same thing.  
We just have to work hard to eliminate the possibility of according the dual nationality status to any person, so 
that people from all over the world who have abandoned their domicile of origin should retain the domicile of 
choice only and no more. It is absolutely wrong for a person to have a dual citizenship at the same time because 
no person can be in two different places at the same time. It will also eliminate crime along the Borders. I would 
also add that once a person acquires a domicile of choice, the person who automatically becomes citizen by 
naturalization should equally have the right to contest for elections in that country, even though he is not a 
citizen by birth. The truth is that he has lived long for a certain number of years, and has become acquainted and 
possibly addicted to the customs and way of life of the people. We have to stop discriminatory practices 
(including those associated with Racism) all over the world, especially in Europe where naturalized citizens are 
currently not allowed to contest elections. This is the only way forward if the comity of nations must really 
stand, and this will also ensure love, peace and unity in the World. 
 
    CONTRASTING THE DOMICILE OF ORIGIN FROM DOMICILE OF CHOICE 
A domicile of origin differs from a domicile of choice in its character, in the conditions necessary for its 
abandonment and in its capacity for revival. Firstly, there is the strongest possible presumption in favor of its 
continuance. As contrasted with the domicile of choice, it has been said by Lord MacNaughten that it is more 
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enduring, its hold stronger and less easily shaken off1. Secondly, since a domicile of choice is voluntarily 
acquired animo et facto, so it is extinguishable in the same manner i.e. merely by a movement from the country 
animo non revertendi and even without acquiring a fresh domicile. When countries make the acquisition of  
a domicile of choice in another country punishable if the Propositors refuse to abandon their domicile of origin, 
people will not easily be acquiring another domicile, knowing that they may end up being without any domicile 
at all or a citizenship status. 
 According to Cheshire, North & Fawcett2, the only distinction between acquisition of a domicile of 
choice and its abandonment is that the latter requires less evidence than the former3, but then the distinction 
between acquisition and abandonment will not arise if people should  
learn to have and accept as their nationality for life just one domicile. 
 The domicile of origin which is not a matter of free will but is communicated to a person by operation 
of Law is not extinguished by mere removal non revertendi. It cannot be lost by mere abandonment and this is 
because you may even abandon your domicile, willingly but provided you have not acquired any domicile of 
choice, your domicile of origin still stands as your domicile. We can see Bell v Kennedy4, which is the leading 
authority for this Rule. In Bell v. Kennedy5, the domicile of origin of Bell was in Jamaica where he had been 
born of Scottish parents domiciled in that Island. He was educated in Scotland, but returned to Jamaica after 
reaching his majority. Some fourteen years later in 1837, he left the Island without any intention of returning, 
resided with his mother in-law in Scotland, and occupied himself in looking for an estate in that country on 
which to settle down. He had not been successful in this when his wife died in 1838, but after her death, he 
bought an estate and it was admitted that at the time of the trial, he had acquired a Scottish domicile. The 
question for decision was - what was his domicile at the time of his wife’s death? It was held that his domicile at 
that moment was in Jamaica, although he had abandoned the Island for good in 1837 and was resident in 
Scotland, he had not at that time decided to make his permanent residence there. The evidence showed that in 
1837, his mind was vacillating with regard to his future home. Therefore, since he had not acquired a Scottish 
domicile of choice, he retained his domicile of origin. 
 
 REVIVAL OF THE DOMICILE OF ORIGIN 
Where the domicile of origin is displaced as a result of the acquisition of a domicile of choice, the Rule of 
English Law is that it is merely placed in abeyance for the time being. It remains in the background, ever ready 
to revive and to fasten upon the Propositus, immediately he abandons his domicile of choice6. It is my view that 
once a person acquires a domicile of choice, he should not be allowed to claim back the domicile of origin, there 
must be strict rules propounded on the change of domicile. If not, people will easily be changing their domicile 
anytime, at the slightest convenience, and can easily acquire more than two domicile before we get to know it. 
Nobody should be allowed in anyway and for any reason to acquire more than one domicile at the same time. 
The flexibility in the Rule of change of domicile has created a lot of difficulties by making it easy for criminals 
to have escape routes to different domicile which they may acquire. For instance, Mr. A can have a domicile of 
origin in which case, he is a citizen of his birth place/country, and next he acquires a domicile of choice in 
country Z (where he is also a citizen), he may commit a crime in his domicile of origin and run to his domicile of 
choice, because he possesses the dual domicile and citizenship/nationality status, and it becomes difficult to trace 
him as a rogue. This is why crime has become very rampant across the different country Borders. Therefore, the 
doctrine of Revival should be abolished to stop people from committing crime, and this will equally make 
population census and available statistical data on identity more reliable. It should be however noted that since 
citizens of some countries are proved to have more criminal tendencies than those of some other countries, it has 
become extremely difficult and totally unacceptable for the whole world to embrace the concept of a uniform 
passport or identity which would have been very desirable. 
 I also would not know why many people of the world have refused to accept to live by their domicile of 
origin throughout their lifetime. Perhaps, part of the problems we are facing today on the issue of domicile is the 
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fact that some countries High Commissions/Embassies just refuse to give people an entry visa into any country 
they intend to visit or study or even work and do business, simply because of a certain bad impression they have 
of the people or that person’s nationality. The Comity of Nations has to sit down and discuss how Border crimes 
can be eliminated. The first solution to be given would be to critically assess any person who wants to enter into 
another country, by finding out the person’s motive for going to that country. Constant refusal of Entry Visas to 
intending travelers have greatly contributed to peoples’ insistence in acquiring a domicile of origin and domicile 
of choice (especially of different countries), thereby having dual nationality which eventually gives a wrong 
statistics of the world data. They do this for the fear of being denied entry into a country they want to visit; some 
people go to any length just to acquire two domicile. For instance, an American citizen by naturalization can 
travel from the USA to many other countries without a visa. Yet, he is a Nigerian citizen by origin and also has 
his Nigerian passport/citizenship. Now what are we talking? The doctrine of Revival does more harm than good. 
Any National of a country that gets entry permit or visa into another country and commits crime at the country 
he enters, should be punished by the Law of that country, and his crime should be treated personally against him 
without any blame being attributed to his country of nationality. In that way, other countries will be more 
realistic and cooperative in issuing visas to genuine travelers. The desperation to acquire a domicile of choice 
and still maintain a domicile of origin will reduce drastically. As a Nigerian citizen, if Mrs. B for instance, wants 
to travel to England on vacation and she is given a visa, each time she intends to travel there, why would Mrs. B 
be tempted to possess a British passport? There is no doubt that a person can change his domicile of origin to a 
domicile of choice, but there should be no room for abandonment of domicile of choice subsequently, once he 
rejects his domicile of origin. The domicile of origin has always been taken for granted as the last hope of every 
person. That policy towards any country of one’s origin should be abolished. No country is useless from 
inception; it is the people in that country that make it good or undesirable. No country of the world should be 
looked down upon. 
 
EXCEPTION TO MY PROPOSITION THAT A PERSON MUST HAVE ONLY ONE DOMICILE 
The invariably one and only exception to this rule is married women, and this is because anything may lead to 
spousal divorce in which case the woman is free to take back her domicile of origin (if it is different from that of 
the man). This means that she must come from a different country from that of the man in my own view. It could 
also possibly have been resolved by the Parties that after the divorce proceedings have been through, the woman 
will drop her domicile of choice (that of the ex-husband)  and take back her domicile of origin. Where the 
divorced husband does not stop her from continuing with his own domicile and she indeed intends to keep using 
the ex-husband’s domicile, then she does not have to revive her domicile of origin. Despite this, a married 
woman should be allowed to use her domicile of origin instead of her husband’s domicile (where his domicile is 
different from hers) if she thinks it would do her more justice without affecting adversely her marriage.  
Whereby the husband refuses to allow her exercise such freedom in the marriage, they both have to mutually 
agree by finding a lasting solution to that issue. If it will make them incompatible, they may cease to contract 
any valid or legal marriage ab initio. Hence, for intending spouses with different domicile, critical issues like this 
should be discussed before all marriage formalities are met. 
 
 
                                     DOMICILE OF DEPENDENT PERSONS 
1.  Children: A child acquires his/her domicile of origin at birth, which could be that of his father (for a 
legitimate child) or that of his mother (for an illegitimate child). A Foundling acquires the domicile of the 
country where he is found as stated earlier.  A child is described in England as any person under the age of 
sixteen years. In Nigeria, it is eighteen years of age for attainment of majority. A child has no power to alter his 
civil status until he is of age and capacity1. But any child below the age of sixteen, whose foreign marriage is 
recognized in England2 will be regarded as capable of having an independent domicile. The primary rule is that 
the domicile of a legitimate child automatically changes with any change that occurs in the domicile of the 
father 3 , while that of an illegitimate child changes with that of his mother. Unfortunately, a change in a 
Guardian’s domicile may not be immediately communicated to the Ward (especially if the Ward is living in his 
school in a far away city). This is another reason why flexibility in the change of domicile should be 
discouraged. 
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 According to the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 19731, where both parents of a child are 
alive but living apart, the child’s domicile is that of the mother if the child has his home with her and no home 
with his father (provided it is mutually agreed by the parents that the mother’s domicile is separate from that of 
the father).  The child in this case continues to retain his mother’s domicile till after her death, unless and until he 
has a home with his father. It is my view in this case that such a child, knowing fully well that both parents have 
different domicile, should not be allowed to change to that of his father (if at all he so desires) till he has reached 
full age and capacity, after which if he decides to take the father’s domicile, he should never be allowed to revert 
to his mother’s domicile again. However, a child acquires on the death of the father, the domicile of his mother2. 
 
2. Lunatics: here, the paramount consideration is the interest of the lunatic, but according to the general 
principle applicable to children, the domicile of the father will be communicated to a child of an unsound mind 
during his childhood stage, but if he continuously remains insane during childhood and after the age of sixteen or 
on attainment of majority, his domicile will continue to change with that of his father (if his father changes his 
domicile). If his insanity started after he had clocked the age of sixteen years or majority, the Court of Protection 
should be entitled to change his domicile, provided it will be for his own benefit. A rule could be adopted to the 
effect that an adult who is mentally disordered or mentally incapacitated should be domiciled in the country with 
which he is for the most time being most closely connected3. 
 
                                     The Position of Corporations 
 A connection with a particular country must be assigned to a Corporation in order that the different rights and 
obligations by which it is affected may be determinable by the appropriate system of Law4. A company should 
be domiciled in the country where the centre of control exists, and can be resident in other countries where it has 
branches, provided we realize that residence in this context does not mean permanent place. Only the Head 
Office can be assumed to have a permanent status. Therefore, the Law of the country of a company or 
Corporation’s Headquarters shall govern every affairs of the Company or Corporation. Branches remain subject 
to control of the Headquarters. Any country that operates Laws that are in conflict with that of a principal 
address of a company should not allow the company to operate a Branch, except it is willing to allow the branch 
to be subject to control of the Laws of its Headquarters5.  
 
The Directors or Management Staff of a Company do not necessarily have to be Nationals of the Country of the 
headquarters. It is sufficient if they are merely resident there with no intention whatsoever to make that country 
their nationality. Where they choose it to be their nationality, the domicile of origin or whichever nationality they 
had prior to this time must be taken away from them. This will equally help to guard against fraud in the 
company. There is no Rule that says the Staff of a Corporation must have the nationality of the Corporation6. 
 
 
                               DOMICILE, NATIONALITY AND RESIDENCE  
According to Cheshire, North & Fawcett7, nationality is a possible alternative to domicile as the criterion of the 
personal law. These are two different conceptions. Nationality represents a man’s political status, by virtue of 
which he owes allegiance to some particular country. Domicile indicates his civil status and it provides the law 
by which his personal rights and obligations are determined. Nationality depends, apart from naturalization, on 
the place of birth or on parentage; domicile ….. is constituted by residence in a particular country with the 
intention of residing there permanently. It follows that a man may be a national of one country, but domiciled in 
another. 
 I humbly disagree that nationality is a possible alternative to domicile because the place you choose as 
domicile of choice should remain your nationality since the person intends to make such a place his permanent 
home. The concepts of nationality and domicile should not be separated; they should be taken to mean the same 
thing, so that we can avoid any person being a citizen of two countries at one and the same time. Therefore, the 
                                                 
1
 S. 4 (1); or S.9 Domicile Act 1982 (Australia); S.6 Domicile Act 1976 (New Zealand) 
2
 Cheshire, North & Fawcett @176; Potinger v. Wightman (1817) 3 Mer 67 
3
 Cheshire, North & Fawcett @178 
4
 Cheshire & North’s Private International Law (10th Edition), Butterworths, 1979 @188 
5
 In my opinion 
6
 In my humble view 
7
 Private International Law (14th Edition), Oxford University Press, 2008 @179-180 
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domicile or nationality of a person should govern his status and personal rights. The two concepts should be 
taken to mean the same thing. However, if a citizen of country A gets a job in country B, the citizen should only 
be said to be resident with a work permit, and not domiciled in country B. Once that citizen decides to make 
country B his domicile, it should be taken that he intends to make that place his permanent home in which he 
won’t only be resident there, but will equally be a national of country B. That should be taken to mean that he 
has lost his domicile of origin permanently for life for the domicile or nationality of choice which in this case is 
by naturalization. The concept of having two domicile at a time should be abolished. 
 Therefore, it is wiser to speak of domicile/nationality and Residence in different terms, the less 
ambiguous the concepts, the better for the world at large. There must be a solution to reducing crimes committed 
in different countries by one person and we must propagate ways of catching a criminal who commits crime in 
country A and tries to escape justice by running into country B. Generally, it is therefore better for one Law to 
govern a person’s status and personal rights. The basic challenge being faced in unifying the concept of domicile 
and nationality is that some countries have diverse legal systems. For instance in Great Britain, it could be one 
system of Law in England, another in Scotland. In Canada, it could be one system in Ontario, another in Quebec. 
It remains my humble opinion that countries such as these should have a Uniform System of Laws which can be 
applicable to all the different States in them in addition to the different system of Laws already being operated by 
the different States (and that where there is conflict between the Uniform System of Laws and those of the 
different States on any subject, the Unified system of Laws should prevail). 
 
Another opinion is that Laws of the different States in any particular country should be very similar in respect to 
all subjects, so that they can be left with only insignificant differences. This certainly unifies any country more, 
but when the Laws of different States within a particular country are very different, there is bound to be crisis as 
the Nationals begin to see themselves as more distant from each other than they actually are. These suggestions I 
have made are all efforts to ensure that only one Law governs a person irrespective of his status or personal 
rights. 
 
                                                     CONCLUSION 
Once a person has just one nationality (or one domicile), the requirements and establishment of proof of 
intention will be done away with, but this difficulty of establishing his intention remains with us all if we 
continue to allow people to abuse the concept of domicile by having a domicile of origin and a domicile of 
choice. 
 
The conclusion that as determinants of the personal law, nationality yields a predictable but frequently 
inappropriate law, and that domicile yields an appropriate but frequently unpredictable law1, will not be 
applicable once everybody has a single nationality or domicile status. Residence no matter how long in a place 
can never be regarded as domicile or nationality without the requisite intention that one wants to be a citizen of 
that country. Hence, a National of any country can live, work and retire in another country, before going back to 
his or her own country. Even where he chooses in retirement not to go back to his country or nationality, 
everything about his life will still be governed by the Law of his own country, even if he dies in the country of 
residence where he worked and retired. Dual nationality should be abolished. Domicile and nationality should be 
defined to have the same meaning or we abolish completely the concept of domicile. With this, even issues of 
jurisdiction over matters concerning people will be made easier to determine, no matter where the person 
affected is found at the particular time the issues or subject(s) for determination come up. Residence whether 
habitual or ordinary residence2 remains mere residence and the place of residence which is not a person’s 
nationality, cannot govern a person’s status or personal rights3. 
 
                                                 
1
 Cheshire, North & Fawcett supra @ 181 
2
 As discussed fully in Cheshire, North & Fawcett @ pp. 183-186 
3
 In my candid opinion. 
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